Edmundson

Moral powers are normally exercised for reasons. One might concoct a recherche´ example in which a moral power is exercised just for the sake of exercise, but normally moral powers are exercised in order to further some end. We promise things, for example, to please or to accommodate others, or perhaps to motivate ourselves to do what we have other reasons to do. But the reasons for action that are the upshot of the exercise of a moral power persist even when it is discovered that the reasons for which the power was exercised are not as had been supposed (Edmundson, 2010: 182).

— Edmundson, W. A. (2010). Political authority, moral powers and the intrinsic value of obedience. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(1), 179–191.

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s